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Abstract: 
We estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that allows for re-
gimes Markov switching (MS-DSGE). Existing MS-DSGE papers for the United States 
focus on changes in monetary policy or shocks volatility, contributing the debate on 
the Great Moderation and/or Volcker disinflation. However, Poland which here 
serves as an example of a transition country, faced a wider range of structural chang-
es, including long disinflation, EU accession or tax changes. 
The model identifies high and low rigidity regimes, with the timing consistent 
with menu cost explanation of nominal rigidities. Estimated timing of the regimes 
captures the European Union accession and indirect tax changes. The Bayesian model 
comparison results suggest that model with switching in both analyzed rigidities is 
strongly favored by the data in comparison with switching only in prices or in wages. 
Moreover, we find significant evidence in support of independent Markov chains.  
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Introduction 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) are the cornerstone of 
modern macroeconomics. These models have traditionally been based on microeco-
nomic assumptions on the intertemporal optimizing behaviors of households and 
firms. Parameters that govern technology and preferences, macroeconomic policy or 
structural shocks are treated as time-invariant. This feature may limit constant-
parameters model capacities to explain certain episodes (e.g., Great Moderation or 
disinflation processes occurring during the Volcker chairmanship). As an alternative 
to the constant-parameters approach, several authors have proposed DSGE models 
that allow one to switch structural parameters based on the actual state of the econo-
my (MS-DSGE henceforth). Numerous studies have investigated monetary policy 
rules and/or shock parameters [see, among others: Schorfheide, 2005; Davig, Doh, 
2008; Bianchi, 2012; Baele et. al., 2015]. Less attention has been placed on explicit 
changes in nominal rigidities, which play a key role in mechanisms of shock propaga-
tion and which often ensure the real effects of monetary policy.  
As a transition economy, Poland experienced major structural changes during the 
early 1990s that resulted in high inflation rates and high levels of unemployment. 
Throughout its transition, the country experienced a long disinflation period that was 
accompanied by several abrupt structural changes (i.e., the adoption of inflation tar-
gets and a fully floating exchange rate regime, VAT changes, sectoral deregulation 
and EU accession). These factors exogenously change institutional frameworks or 
market conditions faced by firms, rendering questions concerning possible nominal 
rigidity changes even more appealing.  
In this paper, we estimate Erceg, Henderson and Levin’s [2000] sticky price and 
sticky wage  model with regime changes in the degree of nominal rigidities. The 
analysis is based on Bayesian model comparisons that involve monthly data on the 
Polish economy for 1996:8 to 2015:6. Like Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez [2005, 2008] 
and Liu, Waggoner and Zha [2011], we use a modified harmonic mean estimator to 
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find marginal data densities that reveal the model’s fit with the data and performance 
in terms of one-step-ahead forecasting [An, Schorfheide, 2007].  
A number of recent papers have analyzed changes in the degree of nominal rigid-
ities based on micro data [e.g., Berradi et al., 2015; Chakraborty et al., 2015; for Po-
land: Macias, Makarski, 2013]. To our knowledge, only few papers have addressed 
switching degrees of nominal rigidities based on aggregate data [Eo, 2009; Liu, Mum-
taz, 2011; Lhuisser, Zabelina, 2015]. However, none of these studies take wage rigidi-
ties into account. Hence, the present study is novel in that it allows for (and tests) 
both price and wage rigidity regime switches. Second, the paper compares independ-
ent regime changes in price and wage rigidity parameters to changes following com-
mon Markov process for both parameters. As nominal rigidities determine the slope 
of the Phillips curve, our work also contributes to the debate on the variations of this 
slope [e.g., Chortareas, Magonis, Panagiotidis, 2012; Vavra, 2014] and to the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. 
Using our proposed model, we identify two regimes even though we apply iden-
tical prior distributions across the regimes. The data strongly favor regime switching 
degree specifications of both price and wage rigidity and support the case of inde-
pendent regime switching relative to common regime for both nominal rigidities. The 
timing of these regimes appears to be intuitive, e.g., low levels of price rigidity occur 
during higher inflation, which is consistent with menu cost explanation. Moreover, 
we find that reactions to monetary policy and technological shocks vary considerably 
across the regimes. 
The paper proceeds as follows: next section presents MS-DSGE model and details 
of Markov-switching specifications, third section describes the particular model used 
in investigation, fourth section presents methodology and data, fifth section shows 
our main results and the last section concludes. 
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DSGE model 
This section presents the New Keynesian DSGE model. The model applied here is 
largely based on a work by Erceg, Henderson and Levin [2000] (EHL henceforth) that 
includes Calvo [1983] sticky prices and wages. The EHL model is theoretically appeal-
ing, as it implies that strict inflation targeting may not be an optimal strategy. On the 
other hand, it can be considered empirically plausible as it allows one to explain infla-
tion persistence owing to the sluggish responses of real marginal costs [see Rabanal, 
Rubio-Ramirez, 2005; 2008; Kuchta, 2014].  
The economy includes a perfectly competitive final goods producer, a continuum 
of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers that are indexed by 
𝑗 ∈ [0; 1], and continuum of households that are indexed by 𝑖 ∈ [0; 1] and a perfectly 
competitive labor agency. We assume that final goods producing firms combine in-
termediate goods using a constant elasticity of substitution technology [see Dixit, 
Stiglitz, 1977]: 
𝑌𝑡 = [∫(𝑌𝑡
𝑗)
1
1+𝜏𝑝𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
1+𝜏𝑝
 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents the final product, 𝑌𝑡
𝑗
 is a quantity of intermediate goods and 
𝜏𝑃 > 0 represents the monopolistic mark-up on the goods market. Each final goods 
producer tends to maximize profits while taking prices of final and intermediate 
goods, 𝑃𝑡
𝑗
, as a given. As a result, the optimal demand for intermediate goods is given 
by: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑗 = (
𝑃𝑡
𝑗
𝑃𝑡
)
−(
1+𝜏𝑝
𝜏𝑝
)
𝑌𝑡 
for all 𝑗 ∈ [0; 1] and where:  
𝑃𝑡 = [∫(𝑃𝑡
𝑗)
−
1
𝜏𝑝𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
−𝜏𝑝
 
is a final good price. 
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Each intermediate good 𝑗 is produced by a firm 𝑗 using the following constant re-
turn-to-scale technology: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑗 = 𝜀𝑡
𝑎𝐿𝑡
𝑗
 
where 𝐿𝑡
𝑗  is labor input, 𝜀𝑡
𝑎 is a technology shock which evolves according to a sta-
tionary first-order autoregressive process: 
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑎 = 𝜌𝑎ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑎 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑎; 𝜂𝑡
𝑎~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0; 𝜎𝑎
2) 
and 𝜌𝑎 ∈ (0; 1) is an autoregressive parameter. Each firm has access to a perfectly 
competitive labor market and pays the real wage 𝑤𝑡 for a labor unit. The introduction 
of linear production technology implies that real marginal cost does not depend on 
the amount of produced goods and it is identical among firms: 
𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑡
𝑗 =
𝑤𝑡
𝜀𝑡
𝑎  
We assume that prices are sticky according to Calvo [1983] and Yun [1996]; how-
ever the parameter of price stickiness follows a first-order discrete Markov process 
with two states and the transition matrix given by: 
𝑃𝑝 = [
𝑝11
𝑝 1 − 𝑝11
𝑝
1 − 𝑝22
𝑝 𝑝22
𝑝 ] 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑝 = Pr(𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 𝑖|𝑠𝑡−1
𝑝 = 𝑖). The transition probabilities are constant over time, as 
there are many possible factors influencing degree of nominal rigidities and we do 
not want limit ourselves to a few of them.  
More specifically, we assume that during each period 𝑡, a portion of randomly 
chosen prices 1 − 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝) ∈ (0; 1), 𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = {1, 2} can be set optimally in order to maximize 
the expected value of future discounted firm real profits, which are expressed by: 
𝐸𝑡 {∑ 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)
𝜏
𝛽𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
𝜆𝑡+𝜏
𝜆𝑡
(
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑌𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑡+𝜏(𝑌
𝑗))} 
under the constraint given by final producer demand, where: 𝑃𝑡
∗ is an optimal price 
level, 𝛽𝜏
𝜆𝑡+𝜏
𝜆𝑡
 is a stochastic discount factor, 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)
𝜏
 measures the probability that price 
set in period 𝑡 will not be reoptimized up until period 𝑡 + 𝜏, 𝐸𝑡 is a rational expecta-
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tions operator and 𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑡(𝑌
𝑗) represents the real total cost depending on the quantity 
of goods produced. The first order condition for a firm that can set price optimally 
is given by: 
𝐸𝑡 {∑[𝛽𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)]
𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
𝜆𝑡+𝜏
𝜆𝑡
𝑌𝑡
∗ [(1 + 𝜏𝑝)𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝜏 −
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
]} = 0 
This implies that each firm sets price in order to equate expected average future mar-
ginal revenues to average future expected mark-ups over real marginal costs with 
weights dependent on the probability of non-reoptimizing price and stochastic dis-
count factor. The other prices, namely 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝), remain unchanged. The real marginal 
cost is constant with respect to produced goods and is identical among firms, and all 
firms face the same demand constraints. Hence, all firms that can optimally choose 
price during period 𝑡 set it at the same level (𝑃𝑡
∗). As a result, we can rewrite the final 
goods price as: 
𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)) (𝑃𝑡
∗)
−
1
𝜏𝑝 + 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)𝑃𝑡−1
−
1
𝜏𝑝]
−𝜏𝑝
 
We assume that all households maximize utility obtained through consumption, 
𝐶𝑡
𝑖, and labor effort. Each household supplies differentiated and imperfect substitu-
tive labor services, 𝐿𝑡
𝑖 , to labor agency which combine them into homogeneous labor 
inputs and sells them to firms. Labor agency aggregates household labor services us-
ing following formula: 
𝐿𝑡 = [∫(𝐿𝑡
𝑖 )
1
1+𝜏𝑤
1
0
𝑑𝑖]
1+𝜏𝑤
 
where 𝜏𝑤 > 0 represents a monopolistic household’s mark-up. Labor agency maxim-
izes profits based on the nominal wage of each household, 𝑊𝑡
𝑖, and market nominal 
wage are taken as a given. As a result, the optimal demand for labor is given by: 
𝐿𝑡
𝑖 = (
𝑊𝑡
𝑖
𝑊𝑡
)
−
1+𝜏𝑤
𝜏𝑤
𝐿𝑡 
for all 𝑖 ∈ [0; 1] and where: 
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𝑊𝑡 = [∫(𝑊𝑡
𝑖)
−
1
𝜏𝑤
1
0
𝑑𝑖]
−𝜏𝑤
 
is a nominal wage in the economy. Finally, a household’s lifetime utility function is 
given by: 
𝐸𝑡 {∑ 𝛽
𝜏
∞
𝜏=0
𝜀𝑡+𝜏
𝑏 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝜏
𝑖 )
1−𝛿𝑐
1 − 𝛿𝑐
− 𝜀𝑡+𝜏
𝑙
(𝐿𝑡+𝜏
𝑖 )
1+𝛿𝑙
1 + 𝛿𝑙
]} 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0; 1) is a discount factor, 𝛿𝑐 > 0 is a relative risk averse parameter and 
𝛿𝑙 > 0 denotes inverse Frisch elasticity. The utility function is affected by two disturb-
ances, a preference shock, 𝜀𝑡
𝑏, and a labor supply shock, 𝜀𝑡
𝑙. We assume that these 
shocks follow a first-order autoregressive process: 
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑏 = 𝜌𝑏ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑏;  𝜂𝑡
𝑏~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0; 𝜎𝑏
2) 
ln𝜀𝑡
𝑙 = 𝜌𝑙ln𝜀𝑡−1
𝑙 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑙 ;  𝜂𝑡
𝑙 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0; 𝜎𝑙
2) 
where 𝜌𝑏 ∈ (0; 1) and 𝜌𝑙 ∈ (0; 1) are autoregressive parameters. 
Households receive income from labor; from financial investments, 𝐵𝑡−1
𝑖 , repre-
sented by one-period riskless nominal bonds; and from shares from firms that pro-
duce intermediate goods, 𝑑𝑡, assuming equal shares among particular households. 
Moreover, each household participates in state-contingent securities, 𝐷𝑡
𝑖, which pro-
tect them from risk related to staggered wage settings. Hence, budget constraint in 
real terms can be expressed as: 
𝐵𝑡
𝑖
𝑅𝑡𝑃𝑡
+ 𝐶𝑡
𝑖 =
𝐵𝑡−1
𝑖
𝑃𝑡
+
𝑊𝑡
𝑖
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑡
𝑖 + 𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the short-term gross nominal interest rate. 
Each household chooses consumption and the quantity of bonds. The house-
hold’s first order condition is given by a standard Euler equation with respect to con-
sumption: 
𝜀𝑡
𝑏(𝐶𝑡
𝑖)
−𝛿𝑐
= 𝛽𝐸𝑡 {𝜀𝑡+1
𝑏 (𝐶𝑡+1
𝑖 )
−𝛿𝑐 𝑅𝑡
𝜋𝑡+1
} 
Moreover, the standard transversality condition should hold in each period: 
lim
𝑡→∞
𝛽𝑡𝜀𝑡
𝑏(𝐶𝑡
𝑖)
−𝛿𝑐
𝐵𝑡
𝑖 = 0 
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We assume that each household can choose nominal wage conditionally accord-
ing to the Calvo scheme. Similarly to firm optimization problem, we assume that dur-
ing every period, a randomly chosen set of households of measure 1 − 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤), 
𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = {1, 2} can reoptimize wage while tending to maximize the lifetime utility func-
tion:  
max
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝐸𝑡 {∑(𝛽𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))
𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
𝜀𝑡+𝑠
𝑏 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑖 )
1−𝛿𝑐
1 − 𝛿𝑐
− 𝜀𝑡+𝑠
𝑙
(𝐿𝑡+𝑠
𝑖 )
1+𝛿𝑙
1 + 𝛿𝑙
]} 
under budget constraint:  
𝐵𝑡+𝑠
𝑖
𝑅𝑡+𝑠𝑃𝑡+𝑠 
+ 𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑖 =
𝐵𝑡+𝑠−1
𝑖
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
+
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
𝐿𝑡+𝑠
𝑖 + 𝐷𝑡+𝑠
𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡+𝑠 
and labor agency demand function: 
𝐿𝑡+𝑠
∗ = (
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑊𝑡+𝑠
)
−
1+𝜏𝑤
𝜏𝑤
𝐿𝑡+𝑠 
where 𝑊𝑡
∗ represents the optimal nominal wage. The rest of the wages, of measure 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤), remain unchanged. Like price stickiness, for wages, we allow for parameter 
switching by assuming that parameter 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤) is governed by a first-order discrete 
Markov process with two states and the transition matrix given by: 
𝑃𝑤 = [
𝑝11
𝑤 1 − 𝑝11
𝑤
1 − 𝑝22
𝑤 𝑝22
𝑤 ] 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑤 = Pr(𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑖|𝑠𝑡−1
𝑤 = 𝑖). The first order condition for wage choice is given by: 
∑(𝛽𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))
𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
𝐸𝑡 {𝐿𝑡+𝑠
∗ [(1 + 𝜏𝑤)𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑡+𝑠
∗ − 𝜆𝑡+𝑠
𝑖
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
]} = 0 
According to this condition, wages are chosen in order to ensure that the ex-
pected stream of future marginal revenues is equal to the expected stream of future 
mark-ups over marginal costs, which are represented in this case by the marginal 
disutility of labor (𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑡), where both are weighed by the future expected labor de-
mand.  
The introduction of state-contingent securities causes each household to be ho-
mogenous with respect to income regardless of the results of the Calvo lottery. More-
over, the utility function is separable with respect to consumption and labor efforts, 
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and labor demand depends only on wages that are chosen by a household. Hence, we 
can limit ourselves to an investigation of symmetric equilibrium whereby all house-
holds that are able to set the wage optimally will select it at the same level.2 This 
property allows us to rewrite the aggregate nominal wage in the economy as: 
𝑊𝑡 = [𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤)𝑊𝑡−1
−
1
𝜏𝑤 + (1 − 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))(𝑊𝑡
∗)
−
1
𝜏𝑤]
−𝜏𝑤
 
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the equilibrium on labor and goods 
markets. In particular, we assume that the following conditions hold in every period: 
1
∆𝑝
∫ 𝑌𝑡
𝑗
1
0
𝑑𝑗 = 𝑌𝑡 
1
∆𝑤
∫ 𝐿𝑡
𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑖 = 𝐿𝑡 
where ∆𝑝≡ ∫ (
𝑃𝑡
𝑗
𝑃𝑡
)
−
1+𝜏𝑝
𝜏𝑝1
0
𝑑𝑗 ≥ 1 and ∆𝑤≡ ∫ (
𝑊𝑡
𝑖
𝑊𝑡
)
−
1+𝜏𝑤
𝜏𝑤1
0
𝑑𝑖 ≥ 1 measure the price and 
wage dispersion, respectively, which in both cases are directly related to staggered 
wage and price mechanisms [see e.g., Yun, 1996, p. 355]. As we are interested in a 
closed economy model without capital accumulation, the aggregate demand equation 
is given by: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 
The model is closed by a monetary policy rule according to Taylor [1993] with in-
terest rate smoothing of the following form: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅
= (
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅
)
𝜌
((
𝜋𝑡
𝜋
)
𝜙𝜋
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑌
)
𝜙𝑌
)
1−𝜌
exp(𝜂𝑡
𝑅) ;                𝜂𝑡
𝑅~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0; 𝜎𝑅
2)     
where 𝜌 ∈ (0; 1) is a smoothing parameter and where 𝜙𝜋 > 0 and 𝜙𝑌 > 0 measure 
interest rate reactions with respect to inflation and the output gap, respectively. While 
the Taylor principle holds in our model with time-invariant parameters, we do not 
assume that central bank reactions to inflation must be always greater than one, as we 
                                                     
2 State-contingent securities also ensure symmetric equilibrium. 
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are also interested in parameter vectors that allow for indeterminacy in one regime 
even when the linear rational expectations model solution exists and is unique. 
Estimated models 
The presented model allows us to consider five different specifications. In the first 
specification (CONSTANT), we assume that all parameters are time-invariant. This 
model is treated throughout our analysis as a benchmark specification. In the second 
specification (PRICES), we allow for Markov switching in the Calvo probability for 
prices 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝), assuming that parameter 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤) is time-invariant while estimating 
1 − 𝑝11
𝑝  and 1 − 𝑝22
𝑝  probabilities. The third specification (WAGES) introduces the 
Markov switching mechanism for the Calvo wages parameter, 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤), while impos-
ing the price stickiness as time-invariant. As a consequence, we estimate 1 − 𝑝11
𝑤  and 
1 − 𝑝22
𝑤  probabilities. In the fourth specification (SYNCHRONISED), we assume that 
both Calvo probabilities, namely 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝), 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤), are time-dependent according to the 
discrete first order Markov process while also assuming that both are governed by 
the same Markov chain. In this specification, we also estimate the transition probabili-
ties for a common chain. In our last specification (INDEPENDENT), we relax the as-
sumption on synchronized changes in price and wage rigidity and consider a model 
wherein both Calvo probabilities are governed by two independent Markov chains. 
In this specification, we also estimate the 1 − 𝑝11
𝑝 , 1 − 𝑝22
𝑝 , 1 − 𝑝11
𝑤 , and 1 − 𝑝22
𝑤  transi-
tion probabilities.3  
Data and methods 
Bayesian techniques are widely used to estimate DSGE models. These methods 
allow one to incorporate prior knowledge into statistical inferences while performing 
reliable model comparisons. The popular approach is based on state-space represen-
                                                     
3 We also account for switching of: policy parameters, shocks’ variances, and parameters governing 
persistence (corresponding results are shown in Appendix C). 
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tation of linear rational expectation model (LRE) solutions; the Kalman filter, which is 
used to evaluate the likelihood function; and the MCMC algorithm, which is used to 
find posterior distribution draws [see, among others, An, Schorfheide, 2007; Fernan-
dez-Villaverde, 2010; Guerron-Quintana, Nason, 2012]. 
 Introducing Markov switching causes the estimation procedure to become much 
more complicated than it is in the constant parameter case. This issue is twofold. First, 
Markov-switching linear rational expectation system solutions are much more com-
plicated, as agents must consider that existing regime can change in the future. More-
over, a rational equilibrium can be indeterminate in certain regimes, even if the solu-
tion of an entire system is unique [see Farmer, Waggoner, Zha, 2005]. As a conse-
quence, popular methods of solving LRE that have been introduced, among others, 
by Blanchard and Kahn [1980], Klein [2000] and Sims [2001] cannot be used. Second, 
likelihood must account for the fact that regimes can change in a sample. Hence, like-
lihood is dependent on possible state histories, causing the number of possible paths 
to grow exponentially.4 As a result, the Kalman filter is difficult to apply [see Blagov, 
2013; Alstadheim, Bjørnland, Maih, 2013]. 
Through our Bayesian estimations of MS-DSGE, we are interested in the vector of 
structural parameters, 𝛚, in the vector of transition probabilities, 𝛗, and in states of 
the system, 𝐒𝐓. These vectors are jointly estimated using the following Bayes theorem 
[see Schorfheide, 2005, p. 401]: 
p(𝛚, 𝛗, 𝐒𝐓|𝐘𝐓, Mi) =
p(𝐘𝐓|𝛚, 𝛗, 𝐒𝐓, Mi)p(𝐒
𝐓|𝛗, Mi)p(𝛗, 𝛚, Mi)
p(𝐘𝐓, Mi)
 
where p(𝐘𝐓|𝛚, 𝛗, 𝐒𝐓, Mi) is the likelihood function of model Mi, p(𝐒
𝐓|𝛗, Mi) denotes 
the prior distribution of the state, p(𝛗, 𝛚, Mi) is the prior for vectors of the structural 
parameters 𝛚, and state probabilities 𝛗 and p(𝐘𝐓, Mi) denotes the marginal data den-
sity, which is given by: 
                                                     
4 For example, if we consider a model with two possible states and evaluate likelihood function using 
10 observations, the number of possible paths is equal to 210. 
12 
 
p(𝐘𝐓, Mi) = ∫ p(𝐘
𝐓|𝛚, 𝛗, 𝐒𝐓, Mi)p(𝐒
𝐓|𝛗, Mi)p(𝛗, 𝛚, Mi) 𝑑(𝛚, 𝛗, 𝐒
𝐓) 
Marginal data density measures the model fit to the data and one-step-ahead fore-
casting performance [An, Schorfheide, 2007, p. 144-147] and is used in our Bayesian 
model comparisons. It is defined as an integral over whole parameters and state spac-
es, and it averages particular likelihoods treating priors for state probabilities and 
structural parameters as weights. It is thus sensitive to the dimensionality of the pa-
rameter and state spaces, and it punishes the model with more parameters when pa-
rameters are empirically irrelevant. As a consequence, a more complex model should 
not necessary be evaluated as better than a simpler model [see Rabanal, 2007, p. 924-
925]. 
We estimate the models examined over several steps. In the first step, we log-
linearize equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state with a zero 
inflation rate.5 We consider the non-inflationary long-run equilibrium, as it ensures 
that steady state in our model is time- and state-independent even when Calvo prob-
abilities switch between particular regimes.6 As a consequence, the steady state does 
not depend on particular system states.7 In the second step, we apply perturbation 
method with first-order approximation in order to find the solution to the Markov-
switching linear rational expectation system. This solution allows us to find the tran-
sition equation for state space representation of the DSGE model. Next, we apply Kim 
and Nelson [1999] filter in order to evaluate the likelihood function. Finally, the 
MCMC algorithm with adaptation and delayed rejection is used to find draws from 
posterior distribution. Obtained draws are then used in order to obtain moments of 
marginal posterior distributions and to evaluate marginal data densities using the 
Modified Harmonic Mean Estimator (MHM) proposed by Geweke [1998].  
                                                     
5 The log-linear form of the EHL model is presented in Appendix A. 
6 It is worth noting that this approach excludes the possibility to analyze changes in inflation targeting 
and determines data filtering methods. 
7 It is theoretically interesting to consider a model with steady state depending on a particular system 
state. We omit this possibility, as the considered model is time-consuming to compute, even when we 
only consider a Markov chain with two states. 
13 
 
Bayesian estimation allows us to compare different model specifications. It is 
worth noting that the comparison results are consistent, even when the models com-
pared are misspecified or nonnested. Performed comparisons are based on the Poste-
rior Odds Ratio given by: 
𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =
p(Mi)
p(Mj)
p(𝐘𝐓, Mi)
p(𝐘𝐓, Mj)
 
where 
p(Mi)
p(Mj)
 is a prior odds ratio and where 
p(𝐘𝐓,Mi)
p(𝐘𝐓,Mj)
 is a Bayes factor. In evaluating a 
particular model, we apply Jeffreys’ rules [see Kass, Raftery, 1995]. Accordingly, we 
treat model Mi as favored by the data when the posterior odds ratio is greater than 
100. Moreover, a posterior odds ratio of less than 3 is interpreted as an insignificant 
difference between compared models. 
The models presented in the previous section are estimated using monthly data 
for the Polish economy for 1996:8 to 2015:6. Although most of the DSGE models are 
estimated using quarterly data, we prefer to use more frequently recorded data for 
two reasons. First, such data allow us to capture not only long- and medium-term 
regime changes but also short-term regime changes that cannot be found using quar-
terly data. Second, monthly data allow us to increase the number of observations, as 
DSGE model estimations for the Polish economy seem to suffer from a limited num-
ber of observations relative to similar studies on the U.S. economy or euro area. Our 
data set includes8 (i) monthly HICP inflation rate, (ii) industrial production volumes, 
(iii) money market interest rates (WIBOR 1M) and (iv) real wages. Before estimation, 
all of the series were filtered.  
All variables in the theoretical model are expressed as a percentage deviation 
from the steady state. Moreover, the theoretical model does not exhibit a balanced 
growth path or inflation in the long run equilibrium. As a consequence, all series 
                                                     
8 All data were collected from the Reuters DataStream database, 
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should be transformed prior to estimation.9 Our approach was conducted as follows. 
First, all series (with the exception of interest rates) were seasonally adjusted using 
TRAMO/SEATS. Second, we removed trends from the logs of real variables using a 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.10 Rather than excluding deterministic trends, the HP fil-
ter does not require explicit assumptions on the growth path of potential output. We 
also exclude the first order difference filter, as it causes observables to be much more 
volatile, thus potentially generating very frequent and biased estimates of regime 
changes (especially when using monthly data). Moreover, we decided to remove de-
terministic trends of nominal variables for 1996:8 to 2003:12. During this period, Po-
land underwent a disinflation process, and the inflation target gradually declined. 
These processes appear difficult to explain using a model with constant long-run in-
flation rate11, causing regime changes rare and biased. Finally, we demeaned all of the 
series.  
Priors 
Before carrying out estimations, it is necessary to specify prior distributions for 
estimated parameters. Smets and Wouters [2003] proposed to divide a vector of pa-
rameters into two groups. The first group includes these parameters, which are cali-
brated and treated as a constant in the estimation. The second group includes param-
eters that are estimated. We follow this approach and calibrate12 the discount factor, 
𝛽; the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, 𝛿𝑙; and household and firm monopolistic 
mark-ups denoted by 𝜏𝑤 and 𝜏𝑝, respectively. We use a value of 0.997 for the parame-
ter 𝛽, implying that the annual steady-state real interest rate is equal to 4%. This value 
appears to be consistent with previous quarterly DSGE model estimations for the 
                                                     
9 Means of transforming data are always a source of controversy. Interesting discussions on this issue 
are provided in Canova [2009] and Chiaie [2009], among others. 
10 When we apply the HP filter, we use 𝜆 = 129600 as proposed by Ravn and Uhlig [2002]. 
11 As noted above, we decided to analyze the model without considering steady state inflation rate as 
this allowed us to assume that long-run equilibrium is independent of regime switching mechanisms. 
12 Chosen parameters are the least important in the transmission mechanism on one hand and difficult 
to identify empirically in the DSGE model on the other. 
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Polish economy. For the 𝛿𝑙 parameter, we select a value of 1.25, which lies between 
micro- and macro-evidence [see Peterman, 2016]. The steady-state firm mark-up 𝜏𝑃 is 
set as 0.1, which is slightly above Hagemejer and Popowski’s [2014] estimated value. 
The same value was selected for the 𝜏𝑤 parameter. Both imply that the elasticities of 
labor and good demand are equal to 11.  
The rest of the parameters were estimated. Our prior distribution selections are 
presented in Table 1. It is worth noting that chosen priors are the same for both re-
gimes. Hence, we do not impose any ex ante restrictions, allowing us to identify two 
different regimes. Moreover, chosen priors seem to be rather diffuse in comparison to 
priors used in previous studies. 
 
Table 1. Prior distributions.  
Parameter Symbol Support Distribution Mean S.D. 
Calvo probability for prices 𝜃𝑃(𝑠𝑡
𝑝) [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.2 
Calvo probability for wages 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤) [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.2 
Relative risk aversion 𝛿𝐶 ℝ
+ Normal 4 1.5 
Monetary policy reaction to inflation 𝜙𝜋 ℝ
+ Normal 1.5 0.25 
Monetary policy reaction to output 𝜙𝑌 ℝ
+ Normal 0.042 0.02 
Interest rate smoothing 𝜌 [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.254 
Technological shock persistence 𝜌𝑎 [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.254 
Preference shock persistence 𝜌𝑏 [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.254 
Labor supply shock persistence 𝜌𝑙 [0; 1] Beta 0.5 0.254 
Technological shock variance σa
2 ℝ+ Inverse Gamma 0.0174* − 
Preference shock variance σb
2  ℝ+ Inverse Gamma 0.0174* − 
Labor supply shock variance σl
2 ℝ+ Inverse Gamma 0.0174* − 
Monetary policy shock variance σR
2  ℝ+ Inverse Gamma 0.0174* − 
Transition probability for prices 1 − 𝑝11
𝑝  [0; 1] Beta 0.0452 0.0285 
Transition probability for prices 1 − 𝑝22
𝑝  [0; 1] Beta 0.0452 0.0285 
Transition probability for wages 1 − 𝑝11
𝑤  [0; 1] Beta 0.0452 0.0285 
Transition probability for wages 1 − 𝑝22
𝑤  [0; 1] Beta 0.0452 0.0285 
* - distribution modes. 
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To reflect the theoretical restrictions, we impose a beta distribution for all param-
eters contained in the interval [0; 1]. For price and wage stickiness parameters, we set 
the mean value to 0.5 and the standard deviation to 0.2. For the other structural pa-
rameters (𝜌, 𝜌𝑎, 𝜌𝑏 and 𝜌𝑙), we use a slightly looser prior, as we are using more fre-
quently recorded data than are typically used. The priors of the transition probabili-
ties imply an average duration (90% HPD) of between 10 and 100 months. For the 
monetary policy reaction parameters, we choose a normal distribution with means 
comparable to Taylor’s [1993] initial calibration. Chosen priors do not restrict the pa-
rameter space to those values that ensure equilibrium determinacy. We do this to re-
flect the fact that for the MS-DSGE model, indeterminacy can be achieved in some 
regimes, even when a system is unique overall. For all of the shock variances, we use 
an inverse gamma distribution in line with the existing literature.  
Results 
This section presents the results of the Bayesian estimation models considered. 
We begin with a short description of the posterior estimates with an emphasis on dif-
ferences between the particular regimes. We then identify regimes using smoothed 
probabilities and perform Bayesian model comparisons to determine the empirical 
importance of Markov-switching for the Polish economy. Finally, we analyze the dif-
ferences between impulse response functions that can occur when we assume that 
parameters governing nominal rigidities are time-dependent. 
All of the results presented in this section are based on an MCMC algorithm with 
2 chains with 400,000 draws each and where the last 200,000 draws are used to find 
posterior distributions for each model. We use the RISE package for this task. 
Marginal posteriors for the estimated parameters are presented in Table 2.13 We 
focus on the posterior mean and on a 90% HPD. Overall, the posteriors are far more 
                                                     
13 A graphical comparison between the priors and posteriors is presented in Appendix B. 
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concentrated than the priors, confirming that most of the parameters were strongly 
affected by the data during the estimation. The exceptions were parameters 𝛿𝑐, 𝜙𝜋 
and 𝜙𝑌. However, the posteriors obtained for these parameters seem to be compara-
ble to those of previous results for the Polish economy [see, among others: Kolasa, 
2008; Kuchta, 2014], especially considering the fact that we used more frequently rec-
orded data than are typically used. Moreover, most of “non-switching” parameters 
do not vary considerably across particular models, even if we assume that the param-
eters governing nominal rigidities were time-dependent. This implies a substantial 
degree of interest rate smoothing, moderate monetary policy reaction to output gap 
and limited reaction to inflation.  
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Table 2. Posterior statistics across the models (means and 90% HPD in parentheses)  
  
INDEPEND-
ENT 
SYNCHRO-
NISED 
PRICES WAGES CONSTANT 
𝜃𝑃(𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 1) 
0.904 
[0.884  0.923]   
0.903 
[0.881  0.923] 
0.912 
[0.894  0.929] 0.936 
[0.924  0.947] 
0.938 
[0.928  0.948] 
𝜃𝑃(𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 2) 
0.942 
[0.933  0.952] 
0.940 
[0.929  0.950] 
0.946 
[0.937  0.955] 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 1) 
0.752 
[0.692  0.806] 
0.773 
[0.730  0.814] 0.860 
[0.841  0.877] 
0.773 
[0.724  0.816] 0.865 
[0.849  0.878] 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 2) 
0.872 
[0.849  0.894] 
0.873 
[0.850  0.895] 
0.880 
[0.859  0.900] 
𝛿𝐶 
6.267 
[4.862  7.736] 
6.184 
[4.769  7.648] 
5.975 
[4.596  7.394] 
6.286 
[4.860  7.762] 
6.085 
[4.676  7.544] 
𝜙𝜋 
1.421 
[1.141  1.709] 
1.418 
[1.128  1.718] 
1.394 
[1.119  1.678] 
1.382 
[1.112  1.664] 
1.375 
[1.095  1.666] 
𝜙𝑌 
0.069 
[0.045  0.093] 
0.068 
[0.045  0.092] 
0.071 
[0.047  0.095] 
0.067 
[0.044  0.091] 
0.069 
[0.046  0.093] 
𝜌 
0.971 
[0.964  0.977] 
0.971 
[0.964  0.977] 
0.970 
[0.963  0.977] 
0.970 
[0.963  0.976] 
0.969 
[0.962  0.975] 
𝜌𝑎 
0.569 
[0.485  0.650] 
0.516 
[0.431  0.601] 
0.555 
[0.472  0.637] 
0.437 
[0.354  0.522] 
0.434 
[0.356  0.511] 
𝜌𝑏 
0.841 
[0.800  0.880] 
0.836 
[0.795  0.875] 
0.830 
[0.789  0.870] 
0.862 
[0.819  0.903] 
0.846 
[0.803  0.888] 
𝜌𝑙 
0.015 
[0.003  0.032] 
0.016 
[0.003  0.032] 
0.016 
[0.003  0.033] 
0.017 
[0.003  0.036] 
0.016 
[0.003  0.034] 
𝜎𝑎
2 
0.215 
[0.141  0.300] 
0.240 
[0.153  0.348] 
0.250 
[0.166  0.346] 
0.350 
[0.224  0.505] 
0.373 
[0.255  0.505] 
𝜎𝑏
2 
0.138 
[0.109  0.169] 
0.136 
[0.106  0.167] 
0.131 
[0.103  0.161] 
0.139 
[0.110  0.170] 
0.134 
[0.105  0.164] 
𝜎𝑙
2 
5.652 
[3.805  7.797] 
5.389 
[3.628  7.460] 
7.541 
[5.643  9.357] 
6.317 
[4.335  8.514] 
7.991 
[6.303  9.571] 
100𝜎𝑅
2 
0.0885 
[0.088  0.089] 
0.0885 
[0.088  0.089] 
0.0885 
[0.088  0.089] 
0.0885 
[0.088  0.089] 
0.0885 
[0.088  0.089] 
1 − 𝑝11
𝑝  
0.073 
[0.034  0.119] 0.068 
[0.043  0.095] 
0.040 
[0.019  0.063] 
N.A. N.A. 
1 − 𝑝11
𝑤  
0.126 
 [0.077  0.179] 
N.A. 
0.124 
 [0.075 0.178] 
N.A. 
1 − 𝑝22
𝑝  
0.039 
[0.020  0.060] 0.158 
[0.104  0.215] 
0.068 
[0.031  0.112] 
N.A. N.A. 
1 − 𝑝22
𝑤  
0.043 
 [0.023  0.066] 
N.A. 
0.045 
[0.025  0.067] 
N.A. 
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We identify two different regimes: (i) one with high price and wage rigidities and 
(ii) one with low price and wage rigidities.14 For the high rigidity regime, the average 
price duration was evaluated for a period of between 15 and 21 months when two 
independent Markov chains were considered (INDEPENDENT) and for a period of 
between 14 and 20 months15 when only one Markov chain was introduced for both 
rigidities (SYNCHRONISED). For the low rigidity regime, these intervals were esti-
mated for values recorded within periods of 9 and 13 months and 8 and 13 months, 
respectively. Similar results were obtained when wage rigidity was assumed to be 
time-invariant.  
We found wage rigidities to be lower than price rigidities in all of the estimated 
models, even when we assumed price and/or wage stickiness to be time-dependent. 
However, this may be somewhat counterintuitive, similar result holds for a variety of 
DSGE models when constant returns to scale are considered [see Smets, Wouters, 
2003]. In the model with two independent Markov chains, wage rigidity was evaluat-
ed for a period of between 3 and 5 months for the low rigidity regime and for a peri-
od of between 7 and 9 months for the high rigidity regime. These results do not 
change substantially when we introduce only one Markov process that governs both 
rigidities and when we assume that price rigidity is time-invariant. 
In contrast to these results, the model with fixed parameters identifies only high 
levels of rigidity for both wage and price stickiness. Our estimates suggest that the 
average durations were evaluated for a period of between 14 and 19 months in the 
case of prices and for a period of between 7 and 8 months in the case of wages.  
By introducing switching between the regimes, we were able to identify low ri-
gidity regimes that cannot be observed in a constant-parameters model. Figure 1 pre-
                                                     
14 It is worth noting that we identify both regimes using the same priors which means that we do not 
impose any ex ante restrictions. 
15 It should be stressed that four different regimes were included in the INDEPENDENT model, as we 
used two independent Markov chains. 
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sents the smoothed probability of the Polish economy remaining in a higher price or 
wage rigidity regime from 1996:8 to 2015:8. The presented values were evaluated us-
ing two independent Markov chains, with one assigned to each form of rigidity.  
 
Figure 1. Estimated probability of higher nominal rigidity regimes (i.e., 𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 2 and 𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 2): 
 
 
 
The probabilities shown in Figure 1 allow us to highlight several results that seem 
to be fairly intuitive, especially for prices. First, lower price rigidity degree were 
found to be more probable at the beginning of the sample, when Poland experienced 
a high inflation period (before 2002). Second, throughout the historically low inflation 
period in Poland occurring after 2004 (and through deflation since the mid-2014), the 
high price rigidity regime has dominated. This result seems reasonable, as during 
high inflation periods, non-adjusting price is more costly, for example due to changes 
in relative prices. More frequent price adjustments (i.e. lower price rigidity) is also 
consistent with a wide variety of models based on the menu cost approach. Third, 
short-lived switching from higher to lower price rigidity degree occurred at almost 
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the same time as two significant institutional changes: May 2004, when Poland joined 
European Union, and January 2011, when VAT rates increased.16  
In contrast to the price stickiness results, the high wage rigidity regime seems to 
dominate the sample. Exceptions include the period of 1999 – 2000, when lower wage 
rigidities were more probable that higher wage rigidities. For the rest of the sample, 
only short-lived switches are observable. Smoothed probabilities seem to be less pre-
dictable than those of high price rigidity regime. One may expect that during high 
inflation periods, nominal wages change more often than they do during low infla-
tion periods, as real wages decrease faster. However, our results can be justified as 
follows. First, our estimates suggest that real wages in the regime of low wage rigidi-
ty are rather flexible, as the average duration is no longer than half a year. Second, 
during high inflation periods, unemployment rates were higher than 10%, potentially 
alleviating pressures to increase wages even when inflation rates were high.17  
 
Table 3. Bayesian model comparisons (MHM logarithm of marginal data density)18 
 log MDD Posterior Odds Ratio* Posterior Odds Ratio** 
INDEPENDENT  −558.30 1.025 ∗ 1023 102 
SYNCHRONISED −562.92 1.005 ∗ 1021 1 
PRICES −599.25 1.680 ∗ 105 1.672 ∗ 10−16 
WAGES −570.44 5.465 ∗ 1017 5.440 ∗ 10−4 
CONSTANT −611.28 1 9.953 ∗ 10−22 
*,** Posterior Odds Ratios were evaluated by treating model Mj as CONSTANT and SYNCHRONISED. 
 
Next, we evaluate the empirical importance of introducing Markov-switching for 
prices and wages by conducting Bayesian model comparisons.19 The results are pre-
sented in table 3. The posterior odds ratios strongly support models with Markov-
switching when they are compared to a model with time-invariant parameters. 
                                                     
16 Note that during Poland’s accession to the European Union, Polish VAT rates also changed substan-
tially. 
17 Similar explanations can be given for the entire period. For example, we do not find strong evidence 
of low wage rigidity regime from mid-2002 to the end of 2004. During this period, unemployment rates 
were higher than 18%. 
18 Applying Laplace approximations did not change the model’s rank. 
19 In Appendix C, we present the results of our Bayesian model comparisons, when taking into account 
regime changes in monetary policy rule, structural shock persistence and shock volatility. 
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Moreover, the models with Markov-switching for both rigidities are strongly favored 
by the data over model PRICES or WAGES. However, the empirical difference be-
tween the model with one chain (SYNCHRONISED) and that with two independent 
chains (INDEPENDENT) is small but sufficient, whereas the difference between 
PRICES and WAGES is extremely significant,20 and the model with wage switching is 
favored. 
Finally, we determine how the economy reacts to disturbances when we allow for 
price and wage rigidity switching. In particular, we compare impulse response func-
tions obtained from the model with time-invariant parameters (denoted in Figures 2 
and 3 as a solid black line with asterisks) with those that can be obtained from the 
INDEPENDENT model. Figure 2 presents the impulse response functions for observ-
ables in the case of technological shock. The dynamics of this model is determined by 
four different regimes: i) low price and wage rigidity regime denoted as solid gray 
lines, ii) low price and high wage rigidity regime denoted by dashed gray lines, iii) 
high price and low wage rigidity regime denoted by dashed black lines, and iv) high 
price and wage rigidity regime denoted by solid black lines. All of these impulse re-
sponse functions were computed from posterior distribution means, which are shown 
in Table 1. 
 
                                                     
20 The posterior odds ratio is equal to 3.25 ∗ 1012 and favors model WAGES with respect to PRICES. 
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Figure 2. Impulse response functions for observables – technological shock 
 
Solid gray lines denote low price and wage rigidity regime, dashed gray lines denote low price rigidity and high wage rigidity 
regime, black dashed lines denote high price rigidity and low wage rigidity regime, black solid lines denote high price and wage 
rigidity regime, and black lines with asterisks denote model with constant parameters. 
 
The appearance of positive technological shock increases output and marginal 
product of labor. Moreover, changes in technology and real wage affect real marginal 
cost and encourage a decline in prices. In turn, inflation rate declines. As interest rate 
is set according to the Taylor rule, it also falls. Marginal product of labor increase al-
lows for changes in real wages. However, reaction sign is regime-dependent and im-
plies that real wage may fall when prices are sticky and wages are relatively flexible.21  
Introducing time-dependent price and wage stickiness substantially increases 
response magnitudes. While high price rigidity regimes (denoted by black lines) ap-
pear to be comparable to constant-parameter models (denoted by a line with aster-
isks), accounting for low price rigidity regimes causes economy to react more strong-
ly to aggregate supply disturbances. Moreover, reaction magnitudes do not depend 
heavily on wage stickiness, though real wage reactions are an exception. 
                                                     
21 This result can be justified as follows. When prices are sticky, very few firms can reoptimize their 
prices while the rest remain unchanged, but all labor units become more productive. Hence, the de-
mand for goods produced by firms that cannot optimize declines and as a consequence, labor demand 
also falls, decreasing real wage, even when positive technological shock is observable in the economy.  
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Figure 3. Impulse response functions for observables – monetary policy shock 
 
Solid gray lines denote low price and wage rigidity regime, dashed gray lines denote low price rigidity and high wage rigidity 
regime, black dashed lines denote high price rigidity and low wage rigidity regime, black solid lines denote high price and wage 
rigidity regime, and black lines with asterisks denote model with constant parameters. 
 
Figure 3 presents impulse response functions for the observables in the case of 
monetary policy shock. The appearance of monetary policy shock increases interest 
rate and causes output and real wage to fall as a result of decreased aggregate de-
mand. In turn, inflation also falls. Interest rate and output responses are comparable 
between particular models, and notable differences are observed in the case of infla-
tion and real wages. Our results seem to be fairly intuitive and suggest that the most 
severe inflation reactions occur during regimes characterized by more flexible wages 
and prices. Both  whereas regimes with high degree of nominal rigidity are similar to 
model with constant parameters. Similarly, the strongest reactions of wages are ob-
served in the regimes with the low wage rigidity. These results suggest that the econ-
omy reacts more strongly on monetary policy shocks during regimes characterized by 
low wage rigidities. Moreover, in contrast to technological shock, response magni-
tudes seem to be governed by wage stickiness switches, whereas changes in price 
stickiness appear to be rather unimportant.   
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined changes in the degree of nominal rigidity in Poland. 
Using monthly data for 1996-2015, we estimated a set of sticky price and wage models 
while allowing for Markov switching in Calvo price and/or wage stickiness parame-
ters. We compared four variants (varying in terms of switching parameters) to the 
model without regime changes (which was treated as a benchmark). Our findings are 
as follows.  
First, the data reveal two regimes and strongly prefer models with switching de-
grees of both price and wage rigidity. The model with two independent Markov 
chains that govern price and wage rigidity is preferred than the model with synchro-
nized price and wage rigidity changes. 
Second, the timing of the estimated rigidity changes is fairly intuitive. The model 
identifies a low price stickiness regime during the transition period when inflation 
rates were rather high, which is consistent with the menu cost interpretation. The 
model also switches in May 2004 when Poland joined the European Union and in 
January 2011 when VAT rates increased. However, we do not find similar results in 
the case of wages, potentially due to high unemployment rates occurring during the 
transition period. Surprisingly, we do not find significant changes in either regime 
during the last financial crisis. 
Third, our comparison of impulse response functions shows that during periods 
of low rigidity, the economy reacts more strongly to structural shocks. The magni-
tudes of responses to technological shock are largely driven by changes in price stick-
iness, whereas wage stickiness switches are rather unimportant. In contrast to the ef-
fects of technological shock, we find that the economy reacts more strongly to mone-
tary policy shock during low wage rigidity regimes, and the magnitudes of responses 
are largely driven by changes in wage stickiness. 
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Appendix A: 
This appendix presents a log-linear representation of the theoretical model. It is 
given by the following equations:  
?̂?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{?̂?𝑡+1} −
1
𝛿𝑐
𝐸𝑡{?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡+1 + 𝜀?̂?+1
𝑏 − 𝜀?̂?
𝑏} 
?̂?𝑡 =
(1 − 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)) (1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝))
𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝)
𝑟𝑚𝑐̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡{?̂?𝑡+1} 
?̂?𝑡 =
(1 − 𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))(1 − 𝛽𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤)
𝑏𝑤𝜏𝑤
𝛿𝑙(1 + 𝜏𝑤) + 𝜏𝑤
𝑚𝑟𝑠̂ 𝑡 + 𝑏𝑤𝛽𝐸𝑡{?̂?𝑡+1 + ?̂?𝑡+1} − 𝑏𝑤?̂?𝑡
+ 𝑏𝑤?̂?𝑡−1 
𝑟𝑚𝑐̂ 𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 − 𝜀?̂?
𝑎 
𝑚𝑟𝑠̂ 𝑡 = 𝜀?̂?
𝑙 + (𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑙)?̂?𝑡 − 𝛿𝑙𝜀?̂?
𝑎 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝜌?̂?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝜙𝜋?̂?𝑡 + 𝜙𝑌?̂?𝑡) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑅; 𝜂𝑡
𝑅~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑅
2) 
𝜀?̂?
𝑎 = 𝜌𝑎𝜀?̂?−1
𝑎 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑎;  𝜂𝑡
𝑎~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑎
2) 
𝜀?̂?
𝑏 = 𝜌𝑏𝜀?̂?−1
𝑏 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑏;  𝜂𝑡
𝑏~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑏
2) 
𝜀?̂?
𝑙 = 𝜌𝑙𝜀?̂?−1
𝑙 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑙 ; 𝜂𝑡
𝑙 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑙
2) 
where 𝑏𝑤 ≡
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤)[𝛿𝑙(1+𝜏𝑤)+𝜏𝑤]
𝛿𝑙(1+𝜏𝑤)+𝜏𝑤−(1−𝛽𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))(1−𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤))𝛿𝑙(1+𝜏𝑤)+𝛽𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤)
2
[𝛿𝑙(1+𝜏𝑤)+𝜏𝑤]
> 0 is a 
parameter, ?̂?𝑡 is the output, ?̂?𝑡 is the nominal interest rate, ?̂?𝑡 denotes inflation, 𝑟𝑚𝑐̂ 𝑡 is 
the real marginal cost, 𝑚𝑟𝑠̂ 𝑡 is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and labor, ?̂?𝑡 is the real wage, 𝜀?̂?
𝑎 denotes technological shock, 𝜀?̂?
𝑏 denotes preference 
shock, 𝜀?̂?
𝑙 denotes labor supply shock, 𝜃𝑝(𝑠𝑡
𝑝) ∈ [0; 1] is the price stickiness parameter, 
𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = {1, 2} represents the discrete Markov chain for the price stickiness parameter, 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤) ∈ [0; 1] is the wage stickiness parameter, 𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = {1, 2} represents the discrete 
Markov chain for the wage stickiness parameter, 𝛿𝑐 > 0 is the relative risk aversion 
parameter, 𝛿𝑙 > 0 is the inverse of labour supply elasticity, 𝛽 ∈ [0; 1] is the discount 
factor, 𝜏𝑤 > 0 is the wage mark-up, 𝐸𝑡 is the rational expectation operator and all var-
iables denoted by “^” represent the percentage deviation from a steady state defined 
for variable “𝑥𝑡” as: 
?̂?𝑡 = ln (
𝑥𝑡
?̅?
) 
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Appendix B: 
Figure B1. Prior and posterior marginal distributions (INDEPENDENT) 
(part 1: structural parameters) 
 
(part 2: shocks persistence and variance parameters) 
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(part 3: transition probabilities) 
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Appendix C:  
This appendix presents the result of Bayesian model comparison for a model with 
time-varying parameters of monetary policy rule (POLICY), shock’s persistence and 
interest rate smoothing (PERSISTENCE) and shock’s variances (VOLATILITY). The 
results provide additional support for the models with switching nominal rigidities 
(INDEPENDENT and SYNCHRONISED). 
 
Table C1. 
 log(MDD) Posterior Odds Ratio* Posterior Odds Ratio** 
INDEPENDENT  −558.30 1.025 ∗ 1023 102 
SYNCHRONISED −562.92 1.005 ∗ 1021 1 
POLICY −611.08 1.223 1.217 ∗ 10−21 
PERSISTENCE −598.68 2.974 ∗ 105 2.960 ∗ 10−16 
VOLATILITY −617.55 0.0019 1.882 ∗ 10−24 
CONSTANT −611.28 1 9.953 ∗ 10−22 
*,** Posterior Odds Ratios were evaluated by treating model Mj as CONSTANT and SYNCHRONISED. 
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Appendix D: 
This appendix presents the summary of estimations with more diffuse priors on Calvo 
parameters. More specifically we assumed prior distribution with 90% HPD ranging from 
0.0975 to  0.9025 (identical for price and wage rigidity, and for both regimes). The remaining 
prior distributions was set as in the baseline (see Table 1 and Priors section). In the Table D1 
posterior distribution for the parameters of interest are presented, while in the Table D2 – the 
Bayesian model comparison results. Overall, this sensitivity analysis show that posterior dis-
tribution was only little affected by change of the priors.  
 
Table D1. Posterior statistics across the models (Calvo parameters only; means and 90% 
HPD in parentheses) 
  INDEPENDENT SYNCHRONISED CONSTANT 
𝜃𝑃(𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 1) 
0.909 
 [0.888 0.929] 
0.907 
[0.887  0.926] 
0.940 
[0.930  0.949] 
 
𝜃𝑃(𝑠𝑡
𝑝 = 2) 
0.945 
[0.935  0.955] 
0.942 
[0.931  0.952] 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 1) 
0.767 
[0.629  0.806] 
0.785 
[0.744  0.823] 0.870 
[0.857  0.880] 
𝜃𝑤(𝑠𝑡
𝑤 = 2) 
0.879 
[0.856 0.899] 
0.879 
[0.857  0.899] 
 
 
Table D2. Bayesian model comparisons (MHM logarithm of marginal data density) 
 log (MDD) Posterior Odds Ratio* Posterior Odds Ratio** 
SYNCHRONISED −559.80 7.862 ∗ 1021 1 
INDEPENDENT −554.98 6.349 ∗ 1023 123.8 
CONSTANT −610.00 1 1.575 ∗ 10−22 
*,** Posterior Odds Ratios were evaluated by treating model Mj as CONSTANT and SYNCHRONISED. 
